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The subject of this thesis includes so much that it
is impossible to treat, in a thorough maner many of its
important branches. A superficial examination of the
general law and a special reference to the statutory
provisions is all that can be attempted. Any further
inquiry would take us beyond the limits of this article.
In order that we may know what we are discussing
it may be v;ell to formulate some definition of a Corpo-
ration. An examination of the text-books and cases
shows that the judges have been very generous in the x'ay
of definitions. One of the most famous is the one given
by Chief Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College Case.
A Corporation as thus defined, is "An artificial being,
invisible, entangible and existing only in contemplation
This definition is too broad for our purpose
as this investigation is limited to the ordinary business
corporations. It has been tersely entitled by various
authorities as a legal entity, a creat ure of the law, a
legal institution and a fictitious or political person.
Justice Field says in 108 W. S. 328 that, "Private cor-
porations are but associations of individuals united for
some common purpose and permitted by the law to use a
common name, and to change its members without a dissolu-
tion of the association." While we can not accurately
define a corporation we can give its principal charac-
teristics and in some degree limit and distingi-ish its
application. They are (1) the limited liability of
stock-holders, (2) the capacity of perpetual succession,
(3) the power to hold real and personal estate, (4) the
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of law, "1
power to make by-laws, (5) the right to use a common
seal, (6) the power to sue and be sued and to grant and
receive in its corporate naee
Of all the questions arising in the domain of
corporation law none are of more importance than those
relating to the liabilities of stockholders and partic-
ularly when the rights of corporate creditors are con-
cerned. This question may be divided into two divisions.
I. The common law liability. The term common law lia-
bility in this sense does not refer to the ancient
common law, as the class of corporations we are dis-
cussing did not then exist, but to those principles of
law which have been so often enunciated and generally
accepted that they are regarded as good law in the several
states whether a particular statute exists or not.
Under this head are also treated those liabilities
which flow from the very fact of incorporation.
II. The Statutory Liability. Under this head refer-
ence is made to the statutes of the several states
which impose a greater liability than that existing
at common law.f1It may be well at this point to discuss
in what manner this liability is incurred. Generally
there can be no question about it. The stock is sub-
scribed, the company organized, the articles of incor-
poration filed, the corporation begins business and
the stockholder becomes liable at once. But oftimes
some irregularity occurs in incorporating which changes
the liability of the stockholder. The failure to com-
ply with the statute should be on some material point.
The company may still be a corporation de facto, still
able and willing to carry out the original intention of
the incorporators but the neglect in complying ex-e-
with provision of the statute deprives the stockholder
of the protection he otherwise was entittled to. It
5must be a corporation de jure in order to give a share-
holder the benefit of his lilited liabilit y. When this
is the case a corporate creditor may proceed against the
stockholders as partners on proof of the company's vio-
lation of the incorporating law, They are bound by the
consequences of their own ats. It is immaterial that
they styled themselves a corporation if they were not
in fact one.
I. The Common Law Liability.
The capital stock of a corporation is regarded in
the eyes of the world as the total amount of stock sub-
scribed whether paid in or not. The unpaid shares are
considered by those dealing with the corporation as part
of the fund out of which creditors are to be paid. It
would be entirely contrary to all accepted ideas of law
and justice to allow a stockholder to escape from the
8liquidation of his unpaid subscription to the detriment
of corporate creditors. Any attempt to evade this li-
ability is regarded as fraud and is generally checked
by the courts. The justice of this is obvious. Oft-
times this is the only resource as the paid up capital
has been sunk in the business and the creditor will be
without any relief if this right is not recognized.
The lir-Ated liability of the shareholder cuts off every
other remedy than that offered by the capital stock.
The general American doctrine is laid down by Justice
Miller in Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall, 610, as follows,
"We think it now well established that the capital stock
of a corporation, especially its unpaid subscriptions,
is a trust fund for the benefit of the general creditors
of the corporation. And when we consider the rapid
development of corporations as instrumentalities of the
conercial and business world in the last few years,
7with the corresponding necessity of adapting legal prin-
ciples to the new and varying exigencies of this busi-
ness, it is no solid objection to such a principle that
it is modern, for the occasion for it could not sooner
have arisen." Stockholders are continually endeavoring
to escape from this responsibility but their efforts
come to naught where there are any grounds which justify
the interference of the courts. "In one case it is
said that it is not within the ingenuity of man to de-
vise a scheme to prevent courts of equity from enforcing
the payment of unpaid subscriptions to capital stock for
the benefit of corporate creditors." Upton v. Hansbrough
3 Biss. 417. This is rather strong doctrine perhaps
but it shows the tendency of the courts and their will-
ingness to grant relief. So strongly is this proposi-
tion established in this country that many states have
incorporated it in their statute books. There seems to
8be no real need for these statutes, except where this is
declared to be the only liability, since no court would
hold anything else in the present state of the law.
They are merely declaratory of the common law It may
be regarded however as an evidence of the wide extent
and fixed character of the doctrine that the capital
stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the benefit
of corporate creditors. A constitutional provision to
this effect may be found in the constitution of Alabama,
Missouri (?), Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia
and Arizona. A similar law exists in Colorado, Del-
aware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisana, Maine, Maryland,
Tichigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Texas. This is the sole lia-
bility in the following states, Alabama, Missouri,
Oregon, Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota
and Texas.
9Any attempt of a stockholder who is also a creditor
to take advantage of his superior knowledge of the af-
fairs of the corporation and receive the payment of his
own claims first will not be allowed. He must first
pay in any amount which he may owe for his stock and
then share equally with other creditors. If a stock-
holder who was also a creditor owed the company on his
subscription an amount equal to his claim he might be
paid in full while the other creditors only received a
small percentage of their claims.
The directors of a corporation or the stockholders
themselves cannot release an individual stockholder from
the obligation to pay his subscription if the rights of
a creditor will thereby be in any way prejudiced.
Any arrangement of the officers to issue certificates
of capital stock as paid up, when in fact only a part
of the subscription has been paid is a gross fraud and
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will be set aside. This may be allowed however by a
unanimous vote of the stockholders if the rights of
creditors are not thereby injured.
This rule is modified in the case of an innocent
purchaser of stock which is issued as paid up when it
is not really so. The question here arises on whom
shall the loss fall as between the purchaser and a cred-
itor. Certainly not on the purchaser for he has a
right to rely on the representations of the officers of
the corporations. The certificate of the officers,
solemnized by the corporate seal, that the stock has
been fully paid up is surely evidence enough. The loss
must then fall on the creditor.
When a business man contracts with a corporation he
takes into consideration the amount of capital stock
which the charter calls for at that time. His rights
will not be changed by any subsequent increase or de-
crease of the stock by an amendment to the charter.
If the stock is decreased while he has a claim against
the corporation, his right to relief will not be lessened
thereby, since the constitutional provision against im-
pairing the obligations of a contract would be violated.
On the other hand an increase in the amount of stock will
not add to his security.
A condition in the subscription that the subscriber
may be excused from the payment of part of his debt to
the corporation on the happening or not happening of
some contingency is void as far as creditors are con-
cerned.
Mere technical grounds are never sufficient to
excuse a shareholder from his obligation. As where the
subscription was paid by a note instead of in cash, it
was held in Little v. Owen 9 Mass. 423, that, "It is
however a sufficient answer to the objection that it
does not lie in the mouth of a stockholder for this
cause to avoid his contract, which as between him and
the company was made on a sufficient consideration."
In Gaff v. Flesher 33 Ohio State 107 the fact that the
corporation had been ousted from its franchises was held
to be no defense in a suit by a creditor to collect a
debt of the corporation from a stockholder. The Court
said, "It seems to us therefore, that this must be held
to have been a corporation de facto, up to the time of
ouster, previous to which the liability arose, satisfac-
tion of which is not sought. Of course the judgment
of ouster did not retroact, so as to affect or destroy
a contract prior to its rendition."
Parties often pay for their stock in property of
some sort presumably such as will be of use to the cor-
poration in its particular business. The valuation of
such property gives rise to much discussion. If the
13
valuation is a fair and just one and the property does
not subsequently depreciate in value to a suspicious
extent no questions can be raised. Nor if the property
was equal in value to the stock at the time it was issued
will the stockholder be liable if the property afterwards
became worthless in the ordinary and legitimate fluctua-
tions of values, But if there is a gross inequality
between the value of the property and the par value of
the stock and known to both corporation and stockholder,
the stockholder will be liable to corporate creditors
for the difference, This applies either to the original
stockholder or to a transferee with notice.
If a corporation in its legitimate business should
lose its entire capital stock by accident, honest mis-
management, or failure of those in business relations
with it to meet their obligations, there is no remedy
for the creditor from the stockholder. The limit of
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his liability is reached when he pays up his subscrip-
tion and what ever assessments may be made either by
authority of the charter or legislature.
The question of what a shareholder's liability at-
taches to is one upon which widely divergent views have
been expressed. Some courts hold that only those are
liable who were members of the corporation at the time
the suit for the collection of the debt was brought.
,This seems to be the more general rule and the one best
supported by reason and justice. If this were not the
rule it would be next to impossible many times to en-
force the right in those companies which have a rapidly
changing membership as many of the original stockholders
might have transferred their stock and moved into another
jurisdiction or have been lost sight of altogether.
This principle is upheld by the courts of Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maine and M"issouri. The contrary doctrine,
that those are liable who were members of the company
at the time the debt was contracted has received some
support. The argument of those holding this view is
not without weight. A person dealing with a corpora-
tion takes into consideration the financial standing of
the persons who are stockholders at that time, especial-
ly if any individual liability exists. The shares may
be afterwards transferred while still not entirely paid
up to persons who at the particular time may be unable
to respond to the call of the creditors. A person pur-
chasing stock after the company has been in business for
some time may come in to the concern totally unaware
of the amount of corrorate debts. He had no voice in
the management of the business when the debt was con-
tracted but once inside he has some means of influencing
the directors.
The dissolution of a corporation in no way impairs
16
the rights of creditors or decreases the liabilities of
a stockholder. No law of the legislature or act of the
corporation can impair the obligation of the delinquent
shareholder to pay his just debt. Where it is neces-
sary, a court of equity will intervene to secure the
rightful dues of the creditor. At comnon law, however,
an entirely different doctrine prevailed. Then disso-
lution served to extinguish all debts whether due to it
or from it. This principle was overthrown by Chancellor
Kent in these emphatic words : "To permit the odious
and obsolete doctrine of ancient date, before moneyed
institutions were introduced, to be applied on the dis-
solution of a bank, perhaps by its own management and
abuse, so that all its assets were to be considered
as dispersed to the winds, without any power anywhere
to collect and justly apply, would be a disgrace to any
civilized state. But this cannot be supposed to have
17
taken place ; the improved and enlightened adninistra-
tion of equity jurisprudence in every part of our country
has taught and established sounder and juster doctrines."
Merritt v. Bank of Port Gibson, 6 Smed. & M. 520.
A brief discussion of the ways in which a stock-
holder may be divested of this liability will not be in-
appropriate. The most comon way in which this is done
is by transfer of the stock. There are no restrictions
upon the equitable use of this privilege. The trans-
feree takes the stock subject to liabilities then exist-
ing and succeeds to all the rights of the transferor
He takes his position. He must, however, follow all
the requirements of the statute in regard to the transfer
such as registry* Any attempt to defraud the company
by transferring the stock to an irresponsible person
will be void as regards creditors. The prevailing doc-
trine on this subject is well stated by Wagner J. in
McClaren v. Franciscus, 43 Md. 467, "The law is well
settled, the point is very clear that no member can ex-
onerate himself from liability or defeat the claims of
creditors by transferring his interest to an insolvent
person or bankrupt. The members of a corporation,
therefore, who would be liable, if they continued mem-
bers, to the creditors of the corporation may still be
treated as members, if they have disposed of their in-
terest to an insolvent, or with the view of exonerating
themselves from their personal liability."
Bankruptcy may also serve to relieve a stockholder
from responsibility. This is the case when the company
is wound up previous to his bankruptcy. Then he is
relieved from all liability by his certificate of dis-
charges But the opposite rule prevails when the bank-
ruptcy and discharge precede the winding up of the com-
pany's affairs. In this case the debt due the corpora-
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tion on the stock is treated the same as any other debt
of the bankrupt and the company shares alike with the
other creditors of the bankrupt.
The death of a stockholder will of course operate
as a transfer of ownership. This, however, does not
divest the representatives of the deceased stockholder
of liability upon the stock. They are liable for his
share of the losses the same as for any of his debts.
The contract which was formed by the signing of the
subscription is some times broken by the directors after
sufficient stock has been subscribed to carry out their
object. They then change the avowed purpose of the
organization and proceed to carry out their real inten-
tions. If this works any substantial injury to the in-
terests of any stockholder he may avoid his contract
providing always he has not assented to the change.
A familiar example is the case of a Rail Road Company
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locating the road in an entirely different route than
that prescribed in the contract of subscription. This
has been held to avoid the subscription. R. R. Co.
v. Marsh 17 Wis. 13.
If a stockholder refuses to pay the assessments
due on his stock, the corporati-n may declare his stock
forfeited to the company. This is not often resorted
to, however, since so many other parties are apt to be
damaged thereby. If the company does not declare the
shares forfeited they still have a right of action for
the amount yet due on the subscription. Tf any credi-
tor's rights intervene this will not be allowed. Any
circumstances tending to show collusion between the
stockholder and directors will tend to invalidate the
forfeiture. But if the affairs of the concern are in
a prosperous condition, the stock paying large dividends,
and selling readily when placed on the market, no com-
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plications will arise as the stock can soon be resold
and the assets will be increased by the amount forfeited.
Justice Hunt in Upton v.Tribilcock 91 U. S. 47, gives a
forcible presentation of this doctrine. "The capital
stock of a moneyed corporation is a fund for the payment
of its debts. It is a trust fund for which the direct-
ors are trustees. It is a trust fund to be managed for
the benefit of its shareholders during its life and for
the benefit of its creditors in the event of its disso-
lution. This duty is a sacred one and cannot be dis-
regarded. Its violation will not be undertaken by any
just minded man and ,ill not be perritted by the courts.
Equally unsound is the opinion that the obliation of a
subscriber to pay his subscription may be released or
surrendered to him by the trustees of the company.
This has often been attempted but never successfully.
The capital paid in and promised to be paid, is a fund
which the trustees cannot squander or give away.
They are bound to call in what is unpaid and carefully
to husband it when received. " It is a well settled
doctrine that a stockholder cannot be released from his
liability if creditors are in any way injured. But a
stockholder may be released by the unanimous consent of
the shareholders and they are afterward precluded from
attempting to enforce his subscription. Garrett v.
Dillsburg 78 Pa. St. 465.
The Statutory Liability.
In addition to the liability which exists by the
general law of corporations for unpaid subscriptions,
the people of many of the states have seen fit either
by legislature enactment or constitutional provisions to
place an additional obligation upon the stockholder.
These responsibilities whether constitutional or legis-
23
lative are known by the general name of statutory lia-
bilities and include all additional burdens beyond the
liabilities for unpaid subscription. These regulations
are for the sole benefit of a corporate creditor and the
remedies they provide can only be invoked by him.
They can never be used by the corporation to keep its
capital unimpaired.
Any attempt to lessen or increase this liability
otherwise than by statute will not be allowed. An in-
dividual responsibility cannot be imposed by a by-law,
nor can a stockholder be exempted from this liability
by the articles of association.
At common law it is clear that no other liability
existed than that for unpaid subscriptions. Any other
oblig;ation must of necessity arise from some statute.
This fact taken in connection with the wide departure
which these statutes make in creating an individual lia-
24
bility have led the courts to construe them very strict-
ly.
A creditor can obtain the relief provided by these
laws only after the ordinary proceedings against the
proceedings have failed. Hence it is a common provis-
ion that the party seeking relief must first obtain
judgment against the corporation and execution have been
issued on the same and returned unsatisfied in #hole or
part before he can proceed under these laws. In some
states, however, no precedent judgment is necessary.
The reason for this provision is easily seen. It is to
retain as much as possible the limited liability of the
stockholder. The courts must be sure that the corpora-
tion is insolvent and unable to pay its debts before they
will allow an action to be cormnenced.
The liability is several and based upon the amount
of shares which the individual holds. The interests
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of the Stockholders are unequal and consequently a joint
judgment cannot be taken. Bank v. Ibbotson 24 Wendell
473, Pettibone v. McGraw 6 Mich. 441.
No legislation shall operate to increase retro-
spectively the liabilities of the stockholders of a
corporation. Their obligations are entirely dependent
upon previous statutes. This principle does not apply,
however, when the legislature has reserved the power to
alter the charter. This is the case in New York under
the general Banking Act, under which the legislature may
impose a personal liability for corporate debts upon
stockholders in banks already existing.
The nature of this personal liability of stock-
holders has given rise to much discussion. Two posi-
tions have been taken on the subject ; one that they are
liable as partners and the other as guarantors. A prin-
ciple feature of the law of suretyship is that the sure-
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ty confers a favor and incurs a liability but receives
nothing in return. This can hardly be said to be the
fact in the case of stockholders. Many of the leading
points in the law of partnership are so entirely differ-
ent from status of a member of a corporation that it is
difficult to see how they can be said to resemble each
other. The easy transfer of membership, the power to
make by-laws, the secondary liability of stockholders,
when any exists, are entirely foreign to an prdinary
business partnership. "Corporators are not partners,
even though rendered liable by statute for certain debts
of the corporation." Baker v° Backus, 32 Ill. 79.
The nature of this liability depends of course entirely
upon the different statutes. In some it resembles that
of a partner and in others that of a guarantor but nowhere
is the likeness so marked that the law of either part-
nership or suretyship are exclusively applicable.
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A satisfactory classification of these statutes is
not easily made. The one given below will perhaps serve
our purpose as well as any.
Those relating,
To laborers,
Banks,
" Railroads,
" Miscellaneous subjects.
1. Laborers.
The evident intention of the legislatures in
framing this law was to protect that class of men who
from their education and position in life are not qual-
ified to care for their own interests. The ordinary
day laborer is not generally informed as to the finan-
cial condition of the corporation for whom he works and
especially needs the protection of the law. They are
men who receive but a small pittance for their services
28
and may be said to be in a certain way in the power of
the corporation. They would never think of asking
security for their services, and it would be refused if
they asked for it. Ericsson v. Brown. 38 Barb. 390.
Michigan is the only state which has a constitutional
provision upon the subject. There are statutes on this
question in nine states, viz ; Indiana, Massachusetts,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin. A very connon
condition in these statutes is that the suit by the la-
borer must be brought within a given time varying from
four months in the two Dakotas, to one year in New York,
or the right to recover is lost. In six of the states
there is no restriction upon this liability. In Wis-
consin and Pennsylvania the individual liability of each
stockholder is limited to the "amount of stock held by
each of them." Considerable litigation has arisen over
the interpretation of the words laborer and servant.
The term servant is held to have a wider meaning than
laborer and is construed by the courts to include some
besides those performing actual manual labor.
The courts generally construe the word laborers to
mean those who are performing some menial labor, who
labor with their hands in preference to their heads.
Professional men are never included. R. R. v. Leuffer,
84 Penn. St. 1G8. One who performs some manual labor
as a mere incident to a more important position which he
holds is not thereby constituted a laborer within the
statute. Kramer v. Ruckel 17 Hun. 463. Laborers are
those whose services rest on their physical rather than
on their intellectual or scientific ability. The ordi-
nary meaning of the word is the one that should be taken.
A few illustrative cases will perhaps show in the best
way how these words are construed. Danforth J. in
Wakefield v. Fargo. 90 N. Y. 213, gives a very clear
and decisive meaning to these words, in deciding that a
book-keeper and general manager is not included within
the statute. "It is plain we think, that the services
referred to are manual or menial services, that he who
performed them rust be of a class whose members usually
look to the reward of a days labor or services for im-
mediate or present support, from whom the company does
not expect credit, and to whom its future ability to
pay is of no consequence ; one who is responsible for no
independent action, but who does a days work, or a stated
job under the direction of a superior." Of great value
also is Selden Ch. J. opinion in Aikin v. Wasson 24
N. Y. 482, where a contractor is held not to be a ser-
vant. "It is obvious from the nature and terms of this
and other provisions of the act, as well as from a gen-
eral policy, indicated by analagous statutes, that the
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legislature intended to throw a special protection around
that class of persons who should actually perform the
manual labor of the company To accomplish this design
it is not necessary that the words "laborers and ser-
vants" should receive their broadest interpretation."
Another good case upon this subject may be found
in Boutwell v. Townsend 37 Barbour 205 where Hogeboom
J. uses the following language. "The obvious intent
and policy of this and similar acts is to make provision
for those who are the workmen and operatives on the road
and who are usually persons of small pecuniary means,
not able to lose their daily earnings and not to compel
them to rely solely either upon the pecuniary responsi-
bility of contractors, or the corporation itself."
II. Banks.
The nature of these corporations shows the
reason for the existence of these statutes. Many peo-
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pie of limited means place all they possess in the hands
of a Bank, and it is only just that more than the ordi-
nary limited responsibility should be cast upon the re-
cipients of the trust. The liability of each stock-
holder is an amo8nt equal to the amount of his stock in
addition to the purchase price of the shares.
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Kansas and
Washington have constitutional provision to this effect.
There are statutes on the subject in nine states ;
Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Montana, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Utah and Maine. In Mon-
tana, however, the total liability of any person or firm
to a bank shall not exceed fifteen per cent of the paid
up capital and surplus.
There are some additions to, and variations from
the ordinary double liability, which it may be well to
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note. In Illinois, Nebraska and Washington the liabil-
ity must accrue while they are stockholders or they
cannot be held for the value of the stock a second time.
This liability continues six months after transfer in
Iowa and Montana, and for one year in South Dakota,
Colorado and Minnesota. The stockholders can be held
by the corporate creditors for any loss caused by the
mismanagement of directors in Maine and Massachusetts.
In Vermont there is no statutory liability unless the
articles of association so provide. In South Carolina
an additional assessment of five per cent on par value
of stock is added to the double liability. The general
liability exists in the case of National Banks.
The provision creating the second liability is
often loosely expressed. The courts, however, have
generally looked to the intent of the legislature in
construing its inaccurate work. Where the law has
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stated the liability to be "The amount of his stock" the
courts have held that it should be construed to mean
"A sum equal to the amount of his stock. In Re Empire
City Bank 18 N. Y. 199. If the law were construed ex-
actly as it stood on the statute book it would be a fool-
ish and unnecessary law as it added nothing to the lia-
bility already existing. The fluctuations of the mar-
ket is not regarded in estimating the amount due under
this statute, but the par value of the stock is taken as
a guide.
III. Railroads.
There seem to be no general laws which are pe-
culiarly applicable to the responsibility of stockholders
in Railroad Corporations. Only a few of any sort exist.
In Minnesota any irregularity in the incorporation of a
Railroad Company will make the stockholders responsible
to the corporate creditors. In South Carolina five
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per cent on the par value of a persons stock is the only
additional burden. In New York and North Carolina,
stockholders in Railroad Corporations are liable for
thirty days services of ordinary laborers.
IV. Miscellaneous Subjects.
There are some miscellaneous statutes which
it is impossible to classify in any satisfactory way,
and they will be given w'ithout any attempt at classifi-
cation,
In Nebraska and Minnesota any irregularity in the
incorporation, makes the stockholders liable as partners.
The Constitution of California contains the following
peculiar provision. "Stockholders in all corporations
are liable for such proportion of all its debts and lia-
bilities contracted or incurred diring the time he was
a stockholder, as the amount of stock or shares owned
by him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital
stock or shares of the corporation or association."
Under the laws of Colorado a stockholder may be gar-
nisheed for unpaid subscriptions. In New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Rhode Island ard Vermont there are provis-
ions of more or less severity concerning the liability
of stockholders when the entire capital stock is not
paid in, and a certificate to that effect filed in the
proper office. In South Carolina this liability other
than in Banks and Railroads is an amount besides the
value of his shares therein, not exceeding five per cent
of the par value of such share held at the time the de-
mand of the creditor was created. In Wisconsin for-
feiture and sale of stock, the delinquent stockholder
is liable for any deficiency. The ordinary double
liability of banking corporation h".s been extended to
all corporation in Florida, Indiana, Ohio, Kansas, ex-
cepting railroads, and T'innesota, excepting those for
37
mechanical and manufacturing purposes.

